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ABSTRACT 
What matters? 
 
This paper takes as its platform a body of work which often draws upon - or 
rather, is located at the intersection of - philosophy, feminist theory and 
science studies and which frequently deploys concepts such as materiality, 
ontology, process, and performativity in order to offer non-reductionist 
accounts of the material world. It seeks to shift the focus of attention in this 
work slightly in order to ask not how something comes to matter, or what it is 
that materialises, but rather: what matters? It begins by briefly exploring the 
ways in which three different theoretical interventions, interventions which 
might loosely be described as 'post-constructivist', seem somehow to lose 
slight of the very thing that is at the heart of their analyses (the very things 
that matter to them). These are: events, in Deleuze's account of the difference 
between a fact and an event in The Fold (2001); values, in Latour's account of 
a fact and a value in Politics of Nature (2004b); and (political) 
difference/transformation in Law and Urry's account of the constitutive power 
of social science research methods in 'Enacting the Social' (2004). The paper 
goes on to argue that the concept of event holds some potentially useful 
orientations with regards the question 'what matters?' and also, importantly, 
that insofar as this concept overlaps with theories of materialisation, it neither 
compromises nor betrays the valuable contributions of work in this area. 
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WHAT MATTERS? 
 
 
We do not have to invent ourselves as radically different from what we 
are, for we are already very different from what we believe ourselves to 
be (Stengers 2000: 164.5).  
 
 
There have been a lot of things that matter in contemporary theory over the 
last fifteen years or so. I mean matter here in Judith Butler's two senses: 
matter in the sense that there has been a lot of work that seeks to address 
materiality, and also matter in the sense that materiality is seen to be 
connected, in one way or another, with power and with some kind of politics. 
 
In 2002 I published an article called 'What is the matter of feminist 
criticism?', which explored how a number of feminist theorists, 'post' critiques 
of essentialism, understood concepts such as materiality, ontology and 
substance. Judith Butler's Bodies that Matter (1993a), which focuses the 
delimiting and schematising role played by processes of materialisation and 
dematerialisation on bodies and identities, was (and remains) important. The 
political significance of her argument is expressed in the title, which suggests 
that some bodies matter, while others do not. I also addressed Karen Barad's 
work, especially as it builds on Butler's. Acknowledging the 'powerful analysis 
of the discursive dimensions of the materialization of real flesh and blood 
bodies' (Barad 1998: 91) that Butler offers, Barad nevertheless proposes, 
perhaps alternatively, an account of 'how matter comes to matter' (Barad 
1998: 108). It would be a challenging task, today, to gather together the 
diverse work on matter and materiality in feminist theory and 'beyond'. If one 
had to identify one thing that they have in common though, both then and 
now, it is perhaps a shared desire to 'rescue', as it were, matter 'from its 
location as both prior and passive with regard to the notion of production' 
(Kirby 1997: 104) and to explore the political implications of this move.1 This 
often, although not always, involves engaging with the natural sciences. 
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This of course is familiar terrain in science studies, which also seeks to link 
issues of materialisation and 'realisation' to politics. Latour's rearticulation of 
matters of facts in terms of matters of concern has been of particular interest 
to me recently (Fraser 2006a and 2008). This distinction, as Latour explicitly 
notes, is designed to circumvent the problem of the (political) use and abuse 
of some of the main tenets of the claim that all facts are 'socially constructed'. 
In his words: 'Should I reassure myself by simply saying that the bad guys can 
use any weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it suits them and social 
construction when it suits them?' (Latour 2004a: 227). Latour has 
undoubtedly been influenced by Isabelle Stengers, and particularly by her 
work on the philosopher and mathematician, Alfred North Whitehead. 
Drawing on Whitehead, Stengers argues that the endurance is an 
achievement, 'the achievement of what goes on mattering' (Stengers REF). 
While this achievement might well be hard won, the sheer existence of a thing 
cannot, Stengers argues, be provide a basis either for politics or ethics. For 
example: 
 
specialists of human sciences who take advantage of the endurance of 
what they describe in order to claim resemblance with the lawful 
objects of natural sciences are doing a bad job. Each time they use their 
knowledge in order to claim that they know what humans and human 
societies may or may not achieve, they contribute to give to what exists 
the power over what could be (Stengers 1999: 204). 
 
It is precisely the power of specialists, and their relation to 'reality', that 
motivates John Law and John Urry's argument in the article 'Enacting the 
social' (2004). Based, interestingly, both on theories of performativity and 
science studies, Law and Urry argue that the methods of social science 
investigation and enquiry are performative, that is, that social science 
methods 'have effects; they make differences; they enact realities; and they 
can help to bring into being what they also discover' (Law and Urry 2004: 
393). And because they do this, Law and Urry continue, social researchers are 
necessarily obliged to ask questions about the realities that they participate in: 
'to the extent social science conceals its performativity from itself it is 
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pretending to an innocence that it cannot have. … If methods are not innocent 
then they are also political. They help to make realities. But the question is: 
which realities? Which do we want to help make more real, and which less 
real?' (Law and Urry 2004: 404).  
 
The (somewhat arbitrary) contributions and interventions that I have 
introduced briefly here are clearly differently motivated, have different roots 
and routes, are located in different contexts and speak to different audiences. 
Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that all are engaged with the question of 
how things comes to matter, and with the question of how that very 'how', shot 
through as it is with power relations, shapes what it is ('entities') that 
materialise. In this paper I want to focus less on how things come to matter, or 
on what it is that materialises, in favour of the question 'what matters?'. For 
example: Barad argues that her work enables her to address not just how the 
contours or surfaces of bodies come to matter, but how 'even the very atoms 
that make up the biological body come to matter' (Barad 1998: 106). But in 
what way, I want to ask, do atoms matter? In what way are they a matter of 
concern? Concern to whom? Because while I do certainly appreciate my atoms 
in an abstract kind of way, in other respects I am actually rather indifferent to 
them. This calls to mind Denise Riley's (1988) question, a question that she 
asked nearly twenty years ago: Am I that name? When exactly, she was asking, 
do I experience myself as a woman? There are of course different moments at 
which different things matter, as Riley herself points out. Contemporary anti-
ageing products have brought the matter of molecules to my attention in a 
very real way. But the example that I have just given is symptomatic of the 
potential 'danger' of asking the question what matters?: I have immediately 
called up a linear model of ageing and identity, and in doing so have betrayed 
the important lessons, about time and temporality for instance, that at least 
some of the theorists I have already mentioned teach. 
 
In other words, the question what matters? seems a bit risky insofar as it 
comes 'perilously' close to a return to a politics understood only and 
exclusively in terms of human subjects, their identities, their consciousness, 
and their agency. Indeed 'human' might be said to have acquired something of 
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the tarnish that 'essential' once had, all those years back, when one could only 
talk about essentialism strategically. In view of this, I will begin to answer to 
my own question using the term 'event'. I have chosen this term, evidently, 
because I think it holds some potentially useful orientations with regards the 
question what matters? I have also chosen it however, because it overlaps with 
theories of materialisation and 'realisation' and thus neither compromises or 
betrays the valuable contributions of recent work in this area. 
 
* 
 
As I said, the concept of event is often associated with notions of 
materialisation and realisation (for want of better descriptions). It serves, in 
Deleuze and Whitehead's work for example, as an alternative to a positivist 
conception of facts, things, entities, happenings. Consider, for instance, 
Whitehead's definition of a molecule: 'a molecule is a historical route of actual 
occasions; and such a route is an "event"' (Whitehead 1985: 80). In line with a 
number of contemporary theories, this definition highlights singularity (the 
specificity of the route in defining the nature of the event) and historicity (the 
historical route). With regards to historicity, it is worth noting that Whitehead 
offers a particularly well-developed theory of time (his atomic theory of time). 
He argues that an event (such as a molecule) does not move through time and 
space and nor do changes occur in space and time. Instead, motion and 
change are attributable to the differences between successive events, each with 
their own durations. 'There is a becoming of continuity,' Whitehead writes, 
'but no continuity of becoming' (Whitehead 1978: 35). Whitehead's work is 
also associated with relationality. Elsewhere for example, he defines the 
'actual occasions' that make up an event as relations. For Whitehead, an actual 
occasion is a coalition into something concrete, a novel concrescence (or 
becoming), of relatedness or prehensions.2 A prehension, understood in terms 
of relationality, is by definition constituted by its prehension of and by other 
prehensions in a nexus (an event). Thus, Deleuze writes, '[t]he eye is a 
prehension of light' (Deleuze 2001: 78), and 'seeing' is an achievement 
conditioned by the event.  
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Already there are several levels or dimensions at work (or at play, rather) 
here: there is the molecule, there are the actual occasions, there is the route 
that these actual occasions take, there is the event which is constituted by the 
route. There is duration. And then on top of this, or below it, or in it, there are 
the prehensions or feelings that coalesce into actual occasions. In other words: 
this is a rather technical, if not a rather exhausting, description (even Latour, 
who clearly has a lot of stamina, admits that Whitehead 'is not an author 
known for keeping the reader awake' (Latour 2004a: 245)). It is a description 
of which one might ask: what does it matter? Certainly, it does not have to 
matter in any 'objective' sense. As Isabelle Stengers notes, one does not have 
to 'believe … that actual occasions do "truly exist", as a matter of fact, just as 
physicists have successfully claimed that atoms exist' (Stengers 2004: 7). 
Indeed Stengers believes that it is a mistake to believe in Whitehead's 
speculative metaphysics, and certainly a mistake to 'apply' it to the world, for 
in doing so one is likely to be led into an adventure, as Whitehead himself 
would put it, in misplaced concreteness. 
 
Although I agree that 'application' is usually neither desirable nor successful, I 
am not especially concerned about the uses and abuses of philosophy by social 
scientists. The importing of concepts from a wide variety of disciplines - from 
art and science, as well as from philosophy - has enabled sociologists to think 
creatively about sociological problems, and sometimes to transform not only 
the problem but also the concepts deployed to explore them. This does not 
mean, however, that it is not worth examining some of the quite difficult 
implications that 'novel' concepts - I'm thinking here of terms like 
performativity, relationality, process, continuity, materialisation - sometimes 
raise. In the next section, I want to briefly explore the ways in which three 
different theoretical interventions, interventions which depend on such terms, 
make it difficult to discern precisely what it is that does matter. It is striking, 
and probably no accident, that these contributions seem somehow to explain 
away the very things that are at the heart of their analyses, the very things, 
that is, that seem to matter to them. These are: the relationality of facts, of 
values, and of (political) difference or transformation. They are found, 
respectively, in Deleuze's account of an event in The Fold (2001); in Latour's 
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account of subjects and objects in Politics of Nature (2004b); and in Law and 
Urry's account of the power of social science method in 'Enacting the social' 
(2004).  
 
* 
 
In The Fold, Deleuze draws on Liebniz and Whitehead in order to emphasise 
the constant enfolding, unfolding, and refolding of matter, time and space. 
'The unit of matter,' he writes, 'the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the 
fold, not the point' (Deleuze 2001: 6). In arguing thus, Deleuze delivers a 
profound blow to any philosophy that rests on a distinction between the 
knowing subject and the object for knowledge (for details of why this is so, see 
Fraser 2006b). In Deleuze's 'objectless knowledge' (Badiou 1994: 67), the 
object refers not to a spatialised relation of form-matter, but to a temporal 
modulation, a variation, in a continuum. Correlatively, the subject, which also 
represents variation, is a 'point of view'. This does not mean that the subject 
'has' a point of view (which would imply a pre-given subject), or that the truth 
varies from subject to subject (which would imply that the truth is relative), 
but rather that the point of view is 'the condition in which the truth of a 
variation appears to the subject' (Deleuze 2001: 20). For Deleuze, truth is 
variation. And, as an immanent inflection of the continuous, the event is the 
condition of truth, the condition of what is possible to be true in any local 
situation (thus the opposite of the truth, in Deleuze's account, is not the false 
but the absurd, or that which is neither true nor false). Which is precisely the 
problem for Alain Badiou. The event, understood by Deleuze as that which 
emerges out of an ontological univocity, 'as what singularizes continuity in 
each of its local folds' (Badiou 1994: 56, emphasis omitted), is too much of the 
world, is so much a part of the world, in fact, that Badiou feels obliged to call 
its singularity into question: how is it possible to distinguish an event from a 
fact if 'everything is event'? (Badiou 1994: 56). Deleuze's concept of the fold is 
so profoundly antiextensional, Badiou argues, so labyrinthine and directly 
qualitative, that he unable to account for the singularity of an event or rupture 
at all. 
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Latour, like Deleuze, owes a debt to Whitehead. While their work is very 
different and cannot be mapped on to each other, it is notable that a problem 
very similar to the one I have just outlined in Deleuze - with regards to facts - 
finds resonance in Latour, with regards to values. Interestingly, Latour does 
not seek to dislodge the fact/value distinction, or even to conflate it. Instead, 
he attempts to replace the vocabulary that describes facts and values, and to 
re-coordinate the axes on which they turn. I will not rehearse the details of 
Latour's position here, which is comprehensively laid out in his chapter on 
this subject (2004b, see especially chapter three). Suffice it to note that Latour 
begins by drawing up a list of requirements that any replacement of the terms 
facts and values must meet, and reorganizes these requirements under two 
headings (or houses, as he calls them): the 'power to take in account: how 
many are we?' (which is the task of the upper house) and the 'power to arrange 
in rank order: can we live together?' (which is the task of the lower house). 
The key point about this reorganization of public life is that by laying out the 
stages by which a candidate for existence becomes natural, Latour seeks to 
extend 'due process', to extend and enroll in other words, as much of the 
collective as possible in the fabrication of the common world.  
 
Unlike in the old constitution then, where the definition of nature required 
that facts be established before values are introduced, we all (and this 'we' 
includes nonhumans as well as humans) participate in the tasks of the two 
houses, where some of these tasks refer to questions of fact, and some to 
questions of value. So far, so unsurprising. If Latour's life work can be 
characterized as an exploration of the lengthy and complex ways in which 
facts are made, created, fabricated, and invented, of the ways in which they 
are not given in the common world, then the idea that ethical questions are to 
be raised only after the facts have been established is bound to be a matter for 
critique. For Latour, it cannot be possible to build the best of possible worlds 
when the question of values (the common good) is separated from the 
question of facts (the common world). He argues instead that these questions 
must be conjoined - as the term 'the good common world', which Latour 
claims is synonymous with Stengers's 'cosmos', indicates (Latour 2004b: 93).  
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The shift that Latour proposes, from the 'the normative requirement from 
foundations to the details of the deployment of matters of concern' (Latour 
2004b: 118), is arguably not a pushing-aside of ethics but rather an extension 
of it to all who/that are involved in world-making. In his words: 'All our 
requirements have the form of an imperative. In other words, they all involve 
the question of what ought to be done. … The question of what ought to be, as 
we can see now, is not a moment in the process; rather, it is coextensive with 
the entire process (Latour 2004b: 125). Just as Deleuze strikes a blow to any 
philosophy that rests on the subject/object distinction (and thus has a special 
relevance to the philosophy of science), Latour strikes a blow to any ethics that 
rests on the distinction between a subject who is active, moral, and able to 
conceive of and establish value and an object which is passive, mute and 
indifferent, and which usually has no call on value at all. The most 
unquestionably valuable dimension of this thesis for me - the extension of 
value, indeed of value-making activity, to all entities (human or not) - is also 
the most problematic: if all praxis, all fabrication, is ethical, then it becomes 
difficult to understand what it might mean to think and act ethically, as 
opposed to what it might be to think and act at all. Ethics, in short, can hardly 
be distinguished from due process.3  
 
My final example concerns Law and Urry's claim that social science methods 
are performative. I will keep my comments brief here, since the point is 
essentially the same. The general thrust of Law and Urry's argument is 
towards a more modest sociology, one that takes into account what feminists 
(for example), as they themselves note, have been saying all along, which is 
that any knowledge (of the world) is partial and that in knowing or seeking to 
know one is also 'interfering' (hence their reference to 'ontological politics'). 
The authors seek to redress, for instance, the idea of social science as 'a source 
of special power' which holds 'the theoretical or methodological key to the 
universe' (Law and Urry 2004: 391). This, problematically they argue, not only 
implies that the social world exists 'out there' and can be properly known and 
understood with the right, rigorous, methodological tools but also that social 
researchers are not implicated in (shaping) the world they investigate. Despite 
this ostensible modesty, there is nevertheless something discomforting, I 
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think, about the power that Law and Urry attribute to social scientists by way 
of a response. What should one make, for instance, of a sentence like this? 
 
The Euclidean compartments and categories of social science, and 
perhaps especially sociological method, were more or less productive of 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century realities (Law and Urry 2004: 
399).    
 
Of course some social science has sometimes played an important role in some 
societies. Law and Urry give several persuasive examples of this, including 
Durkheim's work on suicide, which made comparative suicide rates a fact in 
French society at the turn of the twentieth century, and the processes of 
deviant labelling which became a fact in the 1970s. Whether these specific 
examples - either then or now - can be turned into a more general account of 
the power of social science and its method, however, is another matter. But 
power is, ultimately, what Law and Urry are concerned with. 'This paper', they 
write, in the first line of their abstract, 'is concerned with the power of social 
science and its methods. We first argue that social inquiry and its methods are 
productive: they (help to) make social realities and social worlds' (Law and 
Urry 2004: 390, my emphasis).4 Clearly, Law and Urry are urging social 
researchers to be mindful of what matters. And yet, again, if every research 
project enacts the social world, how are we to distinguish between a social 
science research project and a project that uses social science research 
methods? (And perhaps uses them better, or is better resourced, than the 
social science that is located in the university?). Or: if everything is political, if 
everything matters or comes to matter, how are we to identify those projects 
that make a difference?5  
 
The three theoretical contributions that I have been discussing, contributions 
to which I am especially sympathetic and indebted, invoke notions of 
continuity and especially relationality, of process and performativity, in order 
to offer non-reductionist accounts of the material world. In doing so however, 
the very notions that they seek to redress sometimes come close to slipping 
out of view. Each of them, in their different ways, beg the question as to how 
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one might situate, evaluate, perhaps even measure singularity (Deleuze), value 
(Latour), and political difference (Law and Urry). They make it difficult, in 
other words, to retain a sense of what matters. I want now to explore Isabelle 
Stengers' minimal understanding of event - as something that makes a 
difference between a before and an after - in a little more detail, as a way of 
holding on to this question. 
 
* 
 
The definition of an event, as something that makes a difference, implies that 
not all things do make a difference. Indeed unlike Latour, who often implies 
that all scientific experiments are events (Latour 1999: 306), Stengers 
distinguishes between an experiment which makes a difference, which is an 
event, and sophisticated observation (personal correspondence). So how 
would one recognise an event? There are (at least) two ways of answering this. 
One quite common response is to claim that an event makes a difference to 
the experiences, identities, relations, that acquire their definition through it 
and which also constitute it. As Stengers puts it: 
 
[An event] has neither a privileged representative nor legitimate scope. 
The scope of the event is part of its effects, of the problem posed in the 
future it creates. Its measure is the object of multiple interpretations, 
but it can also be measured by the very multiplicity of these 
interpretations: all those who, in one way or another, refer to it or 
invent a way of using it to construct their own position, become part of 
the event's effects (Stengers 2000: 66-67). 
 
This, then, is a measure; it offers a way of assessing the 'strength', as Law and 
Urry put it, or the viscerality of a 'reality'.6 'What other definition can we give 
to the reality of America,' Stengers writes, 'than that of having the power to 
hold together a disparate multiplicity of practices, each and every one of which 
bears witness, in a different mode, to the existence of what they group 
together' (Stengers 2000: 97). To whom or to what America makes a 
difference, and how it makes a difference, is a matter of empirical 
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investigation in which the methods and theories deployed will themselves play 
a role, as Law and Urry suggest, in shaping (the reality of) what the social 
researcher seeks to investigate. America has physical dimensions, but it is also 
an idea, it is many ideas, and these no less than its physicality constitute the 
materiality of the reality America. In a similar vein, one might argue that 
Butler's theory of the performativity of sex and gender contributes to the 
reality of the sex and gender event (if sex and gender is an event). It does not 
explain the sex and gender event in its 'entirety' however, because this event is 
brought into being (or not) in many different ways. Event-thinking, as Adrian 
Mackenzie notes, foregrounds contingency, 'without basing contingency on 
some specific ontological foundation (such as language, discourse, the body, 
or materiality)' (Mackenzie 2005: 9). Thus while language, discourse, the 
body, materiality may be relevant to sex and gender, they may also not be. No 
account of sex and gender, in other words, 'can have the status' - and here I 
am quoting Stengers on event - 'of explanation, conferring a logically 
deducible character to the event, without falling into the classic trap of giving 
to the reasons that one discovers a posteriori the power of making it occur, 
when, in other circumstances, they would have had no such power' (Stengers 
1997: 216). Just as Butler's theory of performativity is only one account of the 
way in which sex and gender are brought into being, so the performativity of 
social science methods is only one way in which these methods make a 
difference. 
 
The foregrounding of contingency in event-thinking arguably institutes an 
orientation, perhaps even an obligation, towards modesty in social research. 
While Butler's analysis of sex and gender might be applied to identities that 
are not only sexed and gendered - her dazzling analysis of the Rodney King 
video (1993b) would be an example here - it is not necessarily relevant either 
to all identities or even to some identities in the same way, as Saba 
Mahmood's (2005) (limited) critique of Butler in her analysis of Muslim piety 
illustrates. Insofar as entities, identities, relations, happenings, acquire their 
definition through the event and as such are impossible to identify, by 
definition, in advance, event-thinking might be said to be an invitation to 
suspend knowing, for a while, in favour of the risk of learning. Event-thinking 
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gives way, in other words, to a moment of hesitation or uncertainty; and this 
uncertainty is important, for it is in that moment that something newly 
recognised, or something entirely new, might unexpectedly be brought to the 
event. So here (almost inadvertently, as is often the case in accounts like 
these) I have introduced a second familiar dimension of event-thinking: as 
well as offering a way of understanding a 'reality' (where 'reality' itself is the 
thing that makes the difference, that matters), the concept event is also often 
associated with the transformation of a reality, through novelty. In Deleuze's 
work for example, an event, because it is not bound by a particular space or 
time, may be actualised in multiple ways and, as such, retains an openness to 
re-inventions (or re-eventalisations). The concept of the event (informed by 
the concept of the virtual) not only contributes to an explanation of the 
relations between things therefore, but also, for Deleuze, accounts for the 
inexhaustible reserve or excess that produces novelty.7  
 
I have a suspicion that the question of what matters often slips through, or 
falls between, these two dimensions of event-thinking. Thus in a tentative 
attempt to 'rescue' the question of what matters from the rescue of matter 
from the insensate place often ascribed to it, I want to pause a while, between 
these two dimensions, and to emphasise the other side of the term event, the 
side that speaks not to novelty but to endurance, not to difference but to 
indifference, not to relevance but to irrelevance, and not to that which 
connects but to that which is held apart. For while event-thinking is often 
associated with novelty, it is not always. It is notable for example that it is in 
the context of the unlikelihood of novelty and transformation that Whitehead 
talks about power, about the power of what he calls 'inherited ancestry', the 
heavy weight of inherited patterns to which emerging relations are obliged to 
conform, and which become more weighty the further a historic route of like 
occasions is prolonged (Whitehead 1978: 56).8 This is what, I think, Butler 
illustrates so forcefully well in her analysis of sex and gender. Of course Butler 
does not use the term 'historic route' but rather performative or reiterative 
citation; and, not least on account of the different models of temporality that 
inform Whitehead's and her work, these terms cannot be collapsed. 
Nevertheless, they are both addressing the 'cumulative' effects of power over 
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time (or in duration). As Butler notes, the body 'is not a mere positive datum, 
but the repository or the site of an incorporated history' (Butler 1997: 152). It 
is because  Butler illustrates this history so effectively that her claim that 'the 
temporary totalization performed by identity' is a 'necessary error' (Butler 
1993a: 230), that identity is never fully achieved (which is the point of entry 
for her theory of resistance), appears to me to be far less convincing than her 
account of the oppressive efficacy of the heterosexual matrix. The reworking of 
the (materiality of the) signifier in novel ways, 'in the direction of urgent and 
expanding political purposes' (Butler 1993a: 228), seems a daunting 
challenge. 
 
It is on this basis, on the basis of the persuasiveness of Butler's theory of sex 
and gender, that one might argue that while the theory matters, while it is 
itself performative (to use Law and Urry's term), while it contributes to the 
reality of the sex and gender event, it does not make a difference. This is quite 
an uncomfortable position to adopt, not least because this theory has been so 
influential, particularly with regards to feminist and other theories of identity. 
To be more specific, then, I am suggesting that it does not make a difference to 
the actual everyday experience of sex and gender. Indeed, it is arguable that if 
it did make such a difference, Butler would consider it to have failed in its 
purpose. For the purpose of the theory of the performativity of sex and gender 
is not to enable the subject to experience, for example, the profound 
temporality of matter. On the contrary, it is an account of why we do not 
experience sex and gender as constituted in and over time through a series of 
performative acts. (Because reiteration 'conceals or dissimulates the 
conventions of which it is a repetition' (Butler 1993a: 12)). It was the 
(mistaken) view that, in Gender Trouble (1990), Butler was proposing a 
voluntaristic notion of the performativity of gender - the notion that gender is 
a potentially conscious performance - that led her to clarify and develop her 
argument in Bodies that Matter in relation to sex (Sandford 1999: 25). It is not 
performativity that the individual experiences, but its constitutive effects. Or 
more accurately, and in an even more attenuated relation to individual 
experience, it is the material effects of performativity that constitute the 
subject.  
 15 
 My claim that Butler's theory of gender and sex does not make a difference is 
rhetorical; it is made in order to illustrate the work that has to be done in 
order for it to make a difference. That work cannot be underestimated. One 
can only wonder at the historical route - which must enfold into it language, 
education, feminist theory, a relation between theory and practice and 
between theory and embodiment (to name only a few dimensions) - that 
would have to be taken in order for this theory to make a difference to your or 
my daily experience of sex and gender. Whitehead takes up this point himself, 
in relation to the question of relationality. 'All we know of nature', he writes, 
'is in the same boat, to sink or swim together' (Whitehead 2006). This 
speculative metaphysical proposition - that everything is connected - may or 
may not, Whitehead writes, make a theory of causality possible: 'The waves as 
they roll on to the Cornish coast tell of a gale in mid-Atlantic; and our dinner 
witnesses to the ingression of the cook into the dining room' (Whitehead 
2006). But even if the privileging of relationality enables causal relations to be 
established, this is not, for Whitehead, what matters. For him, a relation - a 
relation, say, of causality - is interesting only insofar as it is interested in 
experience. (And just to note again here that 'experience', for Whitehead, is 
understood to be both subjective and objective, human and non-human, 
resource for novelty and source of endurance). This is, to return to a term that 
I mentioned briefly earlier, the point about prehension - that there are no 
things qua things that are grasped in an event, only aspects of things: 
 
The things which are grasped into a realised unity, here and now, are 
not the castle, the cloud, and the planet simply in themselves; but they 
are the castle, the cloud and the planet from the standpoint, in space 
and time, of the prehensive unification. In other words, it is the 
perspective of the castle over there from the standpoint of the 
unification here. It is, therefore, aspects of the castle, the cloud, and the 
planet which are grasped into a unity here (Whitehead 1985: 87). 
 
It may well be, therefore, that the cook is 'a certain dance of molecules and 
electrons', but this fact has only a 'general' bearing on the cook that you can 
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'see … touch … and hear' in the kitchen (Whitehead 2006). 'Situation', for 
Whitehead, is a relation, and not a position in space. And it is a relation that 
must be distinguished from the relation that he calls 'influence'. Of the cook 
and her molecules, Whitehead writes: 'The situations of the perceived 
manifestations of her bodily presence [visible, tangible, audible] have only a 
very general relation to the situations of the molecules, to be determined by 
discussion of the circumstances of perception' (Whitehead 2006). Some 
events in other words, as Whitehead bluntly puts it, are 'quantitatively 
irrelevant' (Whitehead 2006).  
 
To recap: the concept of an event contributes both to an understanding of how 
entities are materially constituted, and to how they might be transformed. In 
order to privilege the question of 'what matters' though, I think that it is worth 
holding these two dimensions apart, so that the former (the contribution that 
event-thinking makes to conceptions of reality) does not absorb, subsume, or 
render irrelevant the latter (which pertains to transformation). Or to put that 
differently, it seems worth remembering that not only are experiences 
constitutive of the event but also that the boundaries of an event are defined 
by its relevance or irrelevance to experience. 'Only indifference', as Stengers 
puts it, '"proves" the limits of the scope of the event (Stengers 2000: 66-67).9 I 
draw attention to this point in order to soften or qualify it, for while it may be 
the case that some events, as Whitehead underscores, are irrelevant, they are 
so only from some perspectives, and their 'irrelevance' is neither inevitable 
nor permanent. Making things matter to each other is the burden that 
'perspectival measure' brings with it. Thus it is not that my molecules are 
never relevant to my experience of myself, 'only' that they must make 
themselves relevant, or must be made relevant. Clearly 'making-relevant' can 
occur in numerous ways. The relevance of the cook to Whitehead's dinner may 
become perceptible only when she is not in the kitchen (maybe she is on 
strike, or maybe, like her molecules, she is dancing).  
 
I find it fascinating, in the light of the overwhelmingly esoteric character of his 
work, that the ultimate test of Whitehead's spectulative metaphysics is 
experience. In fact however, this should come as no surprise since Whitehead 
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was driven to develop his 'natural philosophy', was motivated to script an 
entire metaphysics!, precisely because he was discomforted by the discrepancy 
between a potentially totalising explanation of the world (abstract scientific 
materialism) and the experiences (or more specifically, the values, and 
especially the aesthetic values) that this excludes. Unlike modern science, 
Whitehead argued that natural philosophy 'may not pick up and choose. For 
us the red glow of the sunset should be as much a part of nature as are the 
molecules and electric waves by which men of science would explain the 
phenomenon' (Whitehead cited in Latour 2004a: 244). This does not mean 
that the purpose of speculative philosophy is to act as a corrective, nor is it to 
devalue what scientists value (continuity, for instance). When Whitehead asks 
what it is that Wordsworth finds in nature that 'failed to receive expression in 
science', he does so, he underscores, 'in the interest of science itself; for one 
main position in these lectures is a protest against the idea that the 
abstractions of science are irreformable and unalterable' (Whitehead 1985: 
103). It is in this respect that Whitehead's critique is relevant to all 
(disciplinary) abstractions. It serves as a reminder of what the training of 
professionals (and the training of experience) excludes, a point that 
Whitehead often underscored in order to produce both to 'a restraint upon 
specialists, and also … an enlargement of their imaginations' (Whitehead 
1978: 17).  
 
Science studies shows us how stubbornly enduring the realities of the social 
world are and how unlikely it is that participation in their constitution will in 
itself make a difference. In other words, we are more likely to be enrolled into 
events than we are to create or transform them. Probably we may have very 
little choice in the matter. And it is because we might have very little choice 
that the conscious decision to contribute to the constitution of some realities 
rather than others seems at once both too ambitious and too limiting. It is too 
limiting because, as Law and Urry note, social science researchers (along with 
all other participants in a reality), 'enact' any number of events through their 
participation in them. We contribute to a 'reality', in other words, whether we 
are conscious of or sensitive to the implications or not. While it is certainly 
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worth being conscious and sensitive to this - responsible, in other words - 
enlarging the sociological imagination might be the more ambitious task.  
 
I have argued in this paper that the speedy collapse of 'realisation' with 
novelty, difference, or transformation mitigates against this task because, to 
put it crudely, if everything matters, then it is potentially also true that 
nothing matters, or that there is no basis on which to answer the question 
'what matters?'. Making something matter (in this sense) does not necessarily 
occur, however, by way of a conscious assessment, from the 'outside', of the 
different realities which are to be strengthened or not, as Law and Urry argue, 
nor is it about building bridges between two realities (as if they were external 
to each other). It does not mean bringing a new fact (say), or a new value to 
the event. It concerns, rather, the work of connecting internal connections, of 
connecting the relations, realities and problems within an event. This is why I 
have prefaced this paper with Isabelle Stengers' claim that '[w]e do not have to 
invent ourselves as radically different from what we are, for we are already 
very different from what we believe ourselves to be' (Stengers 2000: 164.5). 
The notion that 'we are already very different from what we believe ourselves 
to be' orients social research, I think, towards modesty: it suggests that, rather 
than becoming overly preoccupied with the invention (or not) of new realities, 
we might instead spend time inventing new practices, and new ways of 
thinking and feeling about the events we are already unavoidably in. One way 
of doing this might be to exploit the uncertainty that the role of contingency in 
event-thinking invites; to understand Whitehead's 'test' (of experience) in 
such a way that demands more than a confirmation of what is already known 
and more than an affirmation10 of existing experiences. 'Test', quite 
differently, could pertain to relevance: to what is relevant, and how; to what it 
is possible to make relevant; to what it is impossible to make relevant, and 
why. And where relevance seems impossible to achieve, where indifference is 
the only 'response', it could be to ask what is it that holds the connections 
apart. To make something relevant to an event is to truly transform it. Real 
transformation, I would guess, is rare, and it may not even be the desired goal 
of a piece of research. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                             
1 As in Marxism for example, where like nature, Haraway argues, 'sex 
functioned analytically as a prime matter or raw material for the work of 
history' (Haraway 1991: 132). 
2 'There are not "the concrescence" and "the novel thing": when we analyse 
the novel thing we find nothing but the concrescence. "Actuality" means 
nothing else than this ultimate entry into the concrete, in abstraction from 
which there is mere nonentity' (Whitehead 1978: 211). 
3 This is why the ascription of a specific role to moralists is one of the 
most confusing aspects of Latour's work in this area. Why is this necessary, 
if every question posed to the world, by whoever or whatever poses it, is 
always already ethical in character? Latour's answer - that moralists, in 
contrast to scientists, politicians and economists, do not have an 
investment in bringing closure to the discussion as to what should be taken 
into account - is hardly inherent to the profession. Indeed, in view of the 
many controversies that surround those who work in this field, and the 
complex networks of power that are invested in the institutionalisation of 
ethics (and bioethics in particular), one might argue that there are others 
- artists, for example - who are far better qualified for the role, as its 
requirements are defined by Latour. 
4 For the sake of brevity, I am not going to engage here with the social, 
historical and institutional conditions that shape social research both 
inside and outside of the university. Instead I am going to indulge in a bit 
of speculation, and ask: Is this emphasis on the 'interfering' character of 
social science modesty, or is it the response of a discipline that no longer 
accrues the same kind of social power that it believes it once did in part 
on account of the authority attributed to its methods to investigate the 
reality of the social world? Is it not 'timely' that social scientists 
should draw attention to the power of their research methods at the very 
same moment that those methods are being replicated and amplified a 
thousand-fold by marketing companies and commercial industries which have 
amply demonstrated how good they are not just at collecting data, but at 
performing and enacting realities?  
5 It is not my intention to suggest that social researchers do not have 
power. There are certainly power relations at work within any individual 
research project and, above and beyond the ethical guidelines that are 
issued by professional bodies (such as the ESRC) to protect both the 
researcher and the researched, such power relations, rightly, have been and 
continue to be explored and analysed extensively by social scientists. 
Whether this means that social researchers have the power to make social 
realities, however, is another question. 
6 There is considerable overlap here with some science studies' 
understandings of 'reality'. For Latour, for example, reality is extracted 
'not from a one-to-one correspondence between an isolated statement and a 
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state of affairs, but from the unique signature drawn by associations and 
substitutions through the conceptual space' (Latour 1999: 161-162). It is 
for this reason that Latour is 'able to talk calmly about relative 
existence' (Latour 1999: 156), 'to define existence not as an all-or-nothing 
concept but as a gradient' (Latour 1999: 310). 
7 For Deleuze, the relation of events to states of affairs is not that of the 
possible to the real, but of the virtual to the actual. The world is actual-
virtual, and as such maintains the power of virtuality, the capacity of a 
thing to become differently. This point is particularly well expressed by 
the infinitive verb, which has two dimensions: on the one hand it is virtual 
and incorporeal, it is a potentiality or becoming, while on the other hand 
it indicates a substantive relation to a state of affairs which, as noted 
above, takes place in a physical time characterised by succession. This is 
why the infinitive is so important to Deleuze's conception of the event. 
8 The ancestry in Law and Urry's piece is interesting. While Butler's 
approach leads her to privilege a philosophical explanation of sex over and 
above a scientific explanation, Law and Urry's use of performativity - 
somewhat unexpectedly, given that sociology has distinguished itself from 
the natural sciences on the grounds that it is obliged to address multiple 
variables that cannot be subjected to the controls that scientific 
experiments promise - enables them to find a model for sociological 
investigation in scientific theories of complexity (this point is both 
qualified and developed in Urry 2003). They liken the performativity of 
social science method to scientific experiment: 'Heisenberg wrote about a 
version of this problem in physics: "What we observe is not nature itself, 
but nature exposed to our method of questioning." There is little difference 
between physics and social science here: theories and methods are protocols 
for modes of questioning or interacting which also produce realities as they 
interact with other kinds of interactions' (Law and Urry 2004: 395). 
9 I would guess that Stengers uses the term indifference here in order to 
mark a contrast (rather than an opposition) with the term difference (as 
that which is constitutive of or constituted by an event). It is quite 
possible however, that indifference may aso be a way of establishing a 
relation to an event or of being defined by it. It is partly for this reason 
that, with regards to the question of the 'edges' of an event, I find the 
terms relevance and irrelevance to be more robust. It is arguable, for 
example, that a feeling of indifference follows from perceived irrelevance. 
However, since my intentions in this article are not to define or proscribe 
a vocabulary for event-thinking but rather to enter into the spirit of the 
problem, I will use these terms somewhat interchangeably in this article. 
10 As I noted in the above endnote, indifference may be a way of being 
constituted by/constituting an event. In a similar vein, it is quite 
possible for 'affirmation' to take the form, say, of refutation. 
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